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ABSTRACT 
Current issues relating to resources in Antarctica, particularly the exploitation of marine 
resources, have focused attention on the issue of maritime jurisdiction in Antarctica. 
This object of this paper is to consider how the regime of maritime zones established by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 can be applied to Antarctica, 
and to assess the legal basis upon which those zones might be asserted by claimants to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. The actions of Australia and New Zealand 
regarding maritime claims are discussed and compared. 
The paper considers the relationship between the maritime zones of UNCLOS and the 
prohibition contained in the Antarctic Treaty against the extension of existing claims or 
the assertion of new claims. The paper concludes that the Antarctic Treaty is reasonably 
able to be interpreted to support both the view that claims to maritime zones are 
prohibited and the view that they are permitted, although the latter argument seems to be 
more strongly supported by international convention and customary law. 
This dual interpretation of the provisions in the Antarctic Treaty and the other legal 
instruments of the Antarctic Treaty System, is the means by which the interests of both 
claimants and non-claimants to territory in Antarctica are accommodated. The paper 
concludes that the interpretation chosen by a particular State Party to the Antarctic 
Treaty will be determined by political objectives relating to sovereignty, rather than 
legal considerations. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 12000 words) 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In May of this year New Zealand hosted the XXIst Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting, whereby the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty meet annually to discuss Antarctic 
matters. Media coverage of the Meeting focused on two particular aspects of the 
Meeting. The first was the failure of the Meeting to address the issue of illegal fishing 
for Dissostichus eleginoides or Patagonian Toothfish in Antarctic waters . The stocks of 
this highly lucrative species are rapidly being depleted despite the existence of a 
regulatory regime in respect of Antarctic fishing. 
The second focus was on the inability of the Meeting to resolve the issue of the location 
of a proposed Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty System, an issue which has plagued 
treaty parties for a substantial number of years. 
Underlying both these failings is the issue of sovereignty over Antarctica. 
Antarctica is the only continent without a recognised sovereign state. It is 
true that seven territorial claims have been made to the continent, but these 
are not recognised by any government in the international community save 
for the claimants themselves, and three of the claimants do not recognise 
the lawfulness of each other' s claim. 1 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the dispute over sovereignty between claimants and 
non-claimants is the defining feature of the Antarctic Treaty System. The System has 
survived by creating a legal regime able to be interpreted by both claimants and non-
claimants consistently with their respective views of the sovereignty issue. The 
dichotomous nature of the legal regime of the Antarctic Treaty System, while enabling 
its survival and the maintenance of peace and co-operation in Antarctica for almost forty 
years, also has also had the effect of creating uncertainty as to the application of other 
1 
Christopher C Joyner Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands , 1992), p 75 . 
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international legal instruments, and particularly the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). 
While the issue of location of the Treaty Secretariat is entwined in issues of overlapping 
claims to sovereignty, the issue of illegal fishing has exposed the difficulty in enforcing 
a regulatory regime in the absence of jurisdiction over the waters to which it applies . 
The basis for the exercise of national jurisdiction over marme areas 1s set out m 
UNCLOS. This Convention determines the maritime zones over which coastal states 
can exercise jurisdiction and the extent to which they can do so. However, the 
dichotomous nature of the Antarctic Treaty System and the ' agreement to disagree' over 
claims also inevitably extends to disagreement over the existence of ' coastal states ' m 
Antarctica. 
Consideration of the legal basis for establishing the UNCLOS maritime zones m 
Antarctica is therefore defined firstly by the disputes as to sovereignty, and secondly, by 
the ambiguity and double meaning of the law of the Antarctic Treaty System which 
flows from those disputes. It is inherently a political issue and it is therefore to be 
expected that the acts of states in this regard will demonstrate a subordination of legal 
considerations to political realities . 
In 1972 Auburn wrote that ' It is true that it will only be when economic resources are 
discovered (in Antarctica) that the real test of the present international harmony will 
come" . 
2 It would seem that this prediction has been borne out by the recent discovery 
of Patagonian Toothfish resources in the Southern Ocean. It may be that claimant states 
will be prompted to consider establishing maritime zones as a way of protecting 
Antarctic resources. However, to do so threatens to push the ·agreement to disagree ' 
over sovereignty beyond the limits of the tolerance of non-claimants. 
2 
FM Auburn The Ross Dependency (Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972), p 43. 
} 
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This paper examines the applicability of the UN CLOS framework of maritime zones to 
Antarctica and concludes that persuasive legal arguments can be made for the 
application of this framework to Antarctica and the establishment of maritime zones in 
accordance with UNCLOS. However, it concludes that whether or not claimant States 
will take such a step is likely to be determined by political considerations rather than 
legal ones. 
The first part of the paper introduces the territorial claims to Antarctica and the 
dichotomous nature of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
The second part of the paper examines the provisions of UN CLOS relating to maritime 
zones and identifies the difficulties in applying them to Antarctica. The opposing views 
of claimants and non-claimants are discussed. 
The third section of the paper considers more closely the legal arguments made in 
support of each view, and concludes that the absence of a recognised coastal state does 
not of itself preclude claimants from establishing maritime zones in accordance with 
UNCLOS. In this respect, the argument that the establishment of those zones is 
contrary to Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty is examined and found to be simplistic. 
The legal position is complex and different considerations are relevant to the different 
zones which are able to be claimed at international law. 
The fourth part of the paper looks at State practice with regard to establishing maritime 
claims in Antarctica, and concludes that every claimant has claimed some form of 
maritime zone adjacent to their claim to the continent itself. The conclusion is reached 
that State practice is varied and does not point to any consistent application of the law of 
maritime zones to Antarctica. 
The final parts of the paper consider the practice of Australia specifically and, in more 
detail, New Zealand, in relation to maritime claims in Antarctica. There are significant 
4 
differences between the actions of each State toward maritime areas and the possible 
reasons for these differences are discussed. Australia has taken a much more assertive 
approach to the declaration of claims, and it is concluded that while the legal arguments 
made in support of Australian actions apply equally to New Zealand, there are political 
and practical reasons why New Zealand may not follow Australia's example. 
II THE ANT ARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
This part of the paper gives a brief summary of claims to territory in Antarctica and an 
introduction to the nature of the Antarctic Treaty System. It is not intended to assess the 
legitimacy of the claims to sovereignty at international law which is unnecessary for the 
purposes of this paper and which is an area of substantial jurisprudence and legal 
analysis in its own right3. 
The United Kingdom (1908), New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933), 
Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1942) have claimed territory in 
Antarctica 
4
. These claims are 'sectoral': a certain point in a land area is occupied and 
claims to sovereignty made sectorally to the South Pole and north to 60 ° Sth. 5 
These sometimes conflicting claims to sovereignty6 and the non-recognition of these 
claims by other States active in Antarctica7 prompted a need for some kind of modus 
vivendi between claimants and non-claimants to be established. The catalyst for action 
came in the International Geophysical Year (1957-8) which emphasised the need for 
cooperation and freedom in the scientific investigation of Antarctica. The Antarctic 
3 
See for example Emilio J Sahurie The International Law of Antarctica (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1992); Christopher C Joyner, seen I above; Sudhir K Chopra and Christopher C Joyner (Eds) 
The Antarctic Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988); Sir Arthur Watts, 
International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1992). 4 
See map of Antarctica showing sectors claimed at Appendix A. 
5 
Bo Johnson Theutenberg The Evolution of the Law of the Sea (Tycooly International Publishing Ltd, 
Dublin 1984), p62 . 
6 
Particularly between the United Kingdom, Chile and Argentina in respect of the Antarctic Peninsular 7 
Specifically, the United States and Russia 
5 
Treaty of 1959 was the result. 8 The Treaty established a legal regime to ensure 
cooperation and freedom of scientific investigation could continue by demilitarising the 
continent and ameliorating the problems of uncertain sovereignty. 
Although the Treaty did not create an international organisation as part of the regime it 
established, it did create a mechanism by which Parties would convene for consultations 
on 'matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica' and to develop measures in 
furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty ' 9 . This mechanism has 
become the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting whereby the Consultative Parties 10 
have developed 'the competence to commence a process of continuous formulation of 
Antarctic law and politics ' 11 which has become known as The Antarctic Treaty System 
(A TS). 12 The A TS is comprised of 
the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under that Treaty, its 
associated separated international instruments in force and the measures in 
effect under those instruments. 13 
These include the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Flora and Fauna 1964 (the 
Agreed Measures) 14, the Convention on Antarctic Seals 1972 15, the Convention for the 
Conservation of Marine Living Resources 1980 (the CCAMLR Convention) 16 and the 
8 The Treaty was negotiated in Washington between Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan , 
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
It entered into force in June 1961, when ratified by all those countries who had been at Washington . 
9 Article IX . 
10 These are currently the original 12 plus Brazil , China, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, the 
Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay. 
11 Davor Vidas in Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas Governing the Antarctic. The Effectiveness and 
Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge University Press , Cambridge 1996), p 37. 
12 For a full analysis of the nature of the Antarctic Treaty System see ibid, Ch 2 . 
13 Article I (e) of the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty for Environmental Protection 1992. 
14 Reproduced in the Second Schedule to the Antarctica Act 1960. 
15 I 080 UNTS 175. New Zealand has not ratified this Convention. 
16 New Zealand ratified this Convention on 22 December 1994. It is reproduced in the schedule to the 
Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 1994, which implements it in New Zealand domestic law. 
6 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 (Madrid Protocol/'. 
A further treaty which has not entered into force , and is not expected to. is the 
Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 1988 (the CRA.\1R.\ 
Convention). 18 
The challenge for the negotiators of the Antarctic Treaty was to devise a means of 
accommodating the interests of claimants and non-claimants in Antarctica. Failure to 
meet this challenge would have rendered impossible achievement of the objectives of 
preserving Antarctica for only peaceful purposes and for co-operation in scientific 
investigation of the continent. The answer was Article IV. The whole of the A TS relies 
on the preservation of the 'agreement to disagree ' embodied in Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty and reiterated in the subsequent instruments it has spav.ned. It has 
successfully kept the peace in Antarctica for nearly forty years. and earned the right to 
be dubbed the ' flexi-glue' of the ATS 19. 
Article IV provides that: 
(1) othing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as : 
(a) A renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted 
rights or of claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica: 
(b) A renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any 
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica \\·hich it may 
have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in 
Antarctica, or otherwise; 
17 
The Protocol has yet to enter into force . All the Consultative Parties must ratif) the Protocol for it to 
enter into force (Article 23 ), and Japan has yet to do so , although it is expected that it will ratif::, before 
the end of thi s year. The Protocol is implemented by e,\ Zealand in the Antarctic (Em ironmental 
Protection) Act 1994. The provisions of the Act not yet in force will do so on entr) into force of the 
Protocol at international law. 
18 
CRAM RA has not been ratified by any of the signatories to the Convention , and has been superseded 
by the Madrid Protocol which creates a total ban on mining in Antarctica. 
19 
Above n I. p 46. Article IV has been variously described as • an example of legal acrobatics which 
poorly conceal an internal contradiction ' (Van der Essen, in Francisco Orrego Vicuna, A.marcric 
Resources Policy: Sc1enrific, legal and political issues (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1983). p 
232 and as having ·frozen· claims into a condition where parties have agreed to disagree (Jo ner, seen I 
above ). 
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(c) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its 
recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim 
or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
(2) No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in 
force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present 
Treaty is in force. 
The effect of Article IV is to protect the interests of both claimants and non-
claimants and preserve their position with regard to territorial claims. The second 
part of the Article provides that the Treaty provisions will operate without 
prejudice to the position of claimants and that the Treaty cannot be interpreted as 
affecting their claims or right to claim or as recognition of any claims. It provides 
that actions of parties for the duration of the Treaty will have no legal effect vis-a-
vis claims, and creates a prohibition against new claims or the enlargement of 
existing claims to territorial sovereignty. 
Triggs best summarises its effect .
20 
The purpose of Article IV was to preserve the apparently irreconcilable 
interests of claimants, potential claimants and non-claimants . As a result, 
this ambiguous Article states what it doesn ' t mean and doesn't state 'what 
it does mean '. It is deliberately obscure, leaving each State free to 
interpret the Article consistently with its particular interests. While Article 
IV creates a ' purgatory of an1biguity ', more positively it enabled the 
parties to move forward to establish the Treaty regime. 
For claimant states, such as New Zealand
21 
the Antarctic treaty does not, as is sometimes suggested, "freeze" or "set 
aside" sovereignty. To the contrary Article IV specifically preserves and 
protects the legal position of all parties. 
20 G Triggs, cited in Crawford, James and Rothwell , Donald R " Legal Issues Confronting Australia ' s 
Antarctica" A YBIL Vo! 13 ( 1992), 53 . 
21 
' Antarctica and New Zealand ' Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Bulletin No 8, August 1984, p 
14. 
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III THE LAW OF THE SEA IN ANTARCTICA 
A The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNCLOS was signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982, after 14 years of 
negotiations in which more than 150 countries were involved. The Convention entered 
into force on 16 November 1994. New Zealand ratified UNCLOS on 19 July 1996 and 
it entered into force for New Zealand one month later. New Zealand has implemented 
the Convention via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Act 1996 and 
through amendments to the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act 1977, which already incorporated into New Zealand domestic law some of the 
customary international law concepts codified by UNCLOS in relation to maritime 
zones. 
This part of the paper examines the framework established by UNCLOS for super-
imposing a hierarchy of zones over the world's oceans and attaching to each zone 
particular rights and obligations. The nature of the A TS is examined and the conclusion 
reached that the determination of whether or not claimant states can establish maritime 
zones in Antarctica requires consideration of both the A TS and the law of the sea 
regime. 
This paper does not consider in any detail the practical difficulties relating to 
Antarctica's geography which any State attempting to delimit such zones would face; 
rather, it focuses on the threshold question of whether there is any basis to do so at 
international law. The paper also considers only the law of the sea relating to 
establishment of maritime zones and not the other ways which it may impact on 
9 
Antarctica, for example, the concept of the common heritage of mankind
22 established 
by UNCLOS or obligations to conserve marine resources in the high seas.
23 
B The Relationship between UNCLOS and Antarctica 
I Maritime Zones established by UNCLOS 
UN CLOS creates a regime of the rights and obligations of coastal states in relation to 
the waters adjacent to their territory. Specifically it establishes for coastal states, 
sovereignty over a belt of sea (12 nautical miles (runs)) adjacent to 
its land territory, called the territorial sea (Article 2) 
particular rights in a zone contiguous to that territorial sea called 
the contiguous zone (Article 33) 
certain rights, jurisdiction and duties over an area (188runs) beyond 
and adjacent to the territorial sea called the EEZ (Article 55) 
certain rights over the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
that extend beyond the territorial sea, called the continental shelf 
(Article 77) 
Antarctica was not formally discussed in the UNCLOS negotiations.
24 Although 
UNCLOS and the Antarctic Treaty negotiations took place at the same time, 
Virtually no one, not even those hoping that Antarctic affairs would be 
regulated through the United Nations, made systematic connections 
between the oceans regime then being modified and the Antarctic regime 
b · d 25 emg create . 
While UNCLOS makes no specific reference to Antarctica, the fact that Antarctica is 
not specifically excluded by the terms of it would support the conclusion that UN CLOS 
22 UNCLOS, Part XI. 
23 UNCLOS, Part VII. 
24
Aubum, FM Antarctic Law and Politics (C Hurst & Company, London l 982), p l 26. 
25 Peterson, MJ "Antarctic Implications of the New Law of the Sea" Ocean Dev and Int ' l Law, Vol 16, 
Number 2, 137, p 138. 
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should be taken to apply there. Furthermore, the basic concepts of maritime zones 
embodied in UNCLOS can now be considered to constitute norms of customary 
. . 1 l 26 mternationa aw. The more difficult question is how the Convention should be 
applied to Antarctica. As one commentator has observed27 
the Antarctic maritime legal regime demonstrates some of the difficulties 
of applying global regimes in regions which not only have a distinctive 
legal regime of their own, but also have peculiar environmental and 
geographical features which combine to negate the effect of the global 
regime. 
2 The Antarctic Treaty System: A surrogate coastal state? 
It is clear that Antarctica does pose umque legal and geographical problems in the 
application of the law of the sea. UN CLOS relies on the concept of the 'coastal state ' . 
Other concepts in the law of the sea are defined by reference to the coastal state. Both 
the 'coastal' and 'state' elements of this concept are problematic in Antarctica. The 
geographical difficulties in identifying 'coastal ' baselines and the legal difficulty in 
identifying a 'state' , and diverging state views relating to both aspects, makes the 
application of the law of the sea problematic. It is an area where, yet again, the 
dichotomy of claimants and non-claimants is at the heart of the application of 
international law to Antarctica. 
From the perspective of a claimant state, inherent in their right to territorial sovereignty 
are corresponding rights and jurisdiction over the maritime areas appurtenant to their 
claimed territory, as determined by international customary law and UNCLOS , and as 
specifically preserved by Article IV (1) of the Antarctic Treaty. The practice of 
claimants reflects this view of the law of the sea. 28 
26 
The Antarctic Treaty itself preserves the rights of States in the High Seas under international law 
(Article YI) . 
27
Rothwell , Donald R " A Maritime Analysis of Conflicting International Law Regimes in Antarctica and 
the Southern Ocean" 15 A YBIL 155, 180. 
is See Part V for a summary of maritime zones asserted by claimants in Antarctica . 
11 
From the perspective of a non-claimant state, the absence of sovereign states m 
Antarctica means that no state may exercise territorial jurisdiction over adjacent 
maritime areas, and the assertion of any such jurisdiction would be a breach of Article 
IV(2) of the Antarctic Treaty. The surrounding waters, therefore, are high seas right up 
to the coastline of Antarctica in accordance with Article 86
29 of UN CLOS. 
In 1959, the relatively narrow bands of coastal state jurisdiction accepted 
by most states, and the paucity of activity in the Southern Ocean, meant 
these differences could be ignored.
30 
As changes in the economics of fishing and hydrocarbon exploitation focused attention 
on control of those resources, and, consequentially, the UNCLOS negotiations moved 
towards coastal state jurisdiction over a 200 nm zone, the separation between issues 
relating to the oceans and issues relating to Antarctica began to break down. 
31 
At a time when the compromise on sovereignty at the heart of the Antarctic Treaty 
looked in danger of collapsing under these pressures, the Parties illustrated their 
adaptability by developing a collective regime to fill the gap left by the absence of a 
recognised coastal state. Beginning with the Agreed Measures, followed by CCAMLR 
and most recently by the Madrid Protocol, the A TS regulates activities in Antarctica and 
the surrounding waters for the purpose of conserving living resources and protecting the 
environment of Antarctica, very much in the same manner as a coastal state might, with 
the very important difference being that the measures devised by the A TS are 
enforceable only as against each other and not against non-members of the A TS . Joyner 
argues that3
2 
29 
Article 86 provides that ' all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters ofa State, or in the archipelagic State ' shall be High Seas. 
30 See n 25 above, p 141. 
31 
Ibid, p 138 . 
3"See n I above, p 96 . 
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while no traditional coastal state or sovereign exists in Antarctica, a 
political authority embodied in a multinational treaty institution does m 
fact operate throughout the region. 
Hence, Vidas states that the proper approach to jurisdiction over the waters surrounding 
Antarctica33 
lies not in the direct application of the general law of the sea to the 
Antarctic maritime area, but in the concurrence of the two existing systems 
of legal norms, that is, the law of the sea (mainly as codified in the 1982 
LOS Convention) and the ATS. 
IV THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME ZONES IN ANTARCTICA 
At the heart of the interface between the law of the sea and the Antarctic Treaty is the 
question of maritime claims in Antarctica. This part of the paper considers the 
arguments made in support of claimant states not being able to exercise their rights as 
coastal states in Antarctica. It concludes that in fact the establishment of such zones is 
not prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty. However, while there may arguably be a legal 
case to be made for the establishment of maritime zones, whether or not states will do so 
will depend on political rather than legal factors. 
In broad terms, there are two main arguments which are usually made against claimant 
states being legally entitled to establish maritime zones, and exercise the rights which 
inhere in a coastal state in respect of such zones, in Antarctica. The first is that in the 
absence of a recognised sovereign state in Antarctica maritime zones cannot be 
established (Part A of this Part) . The second is that the establishment of such zones is 
prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty. This part of the paper considers these two 
arguments. Part B consider whether Article IV applies to maritime areas and claims and 
concludes that it does . Part C considers how Article IV applies and whether its affect is 
to prohibit the establishment of such zones. The different considerations relevant to 
33 See n 11 above, p 70. 
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each zone are identified. The conclusion is reached that the establishment by claimants 
of a territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ is consistent with the Antarctic Treaty. 
A The Search for a Coastal State 
It has been argued that, in the absence of a recognised sovereign state, there is no legal 
capacity to designate lawfully recognised zones of offshore jurisdiction.
34 
However, 
some commentators do not view uncertainty as to territorial sovereignty to be a barrier 
to the exercise of rights accorded to 'coastal states' by UN CLOS. Kaye argues that non-
recognition of land claims does not alter the fact that a claimant state is entitled to assert 
its rights offshore from the Antarctic territories while it maintains an existing claim to 
those territories. 
35 
It would seem logical that a claim to territorial sovereignty is also a claim to all the 
rights which flow from that claim at international law. The practice of claimants has 
been to establish varying maritime zones as an incident of their claim to territorial 
sovereignty which would seem to support this view. Therefore the lack of international 
recognition of a claim to territorial sovereignty does not, of itself, preclude claims to 
maritime zones which international Jaw has determined to be a consequence of that 
claim to territorial sovereignty. 
The question is therefore to what extent the assertion of national jurisdiction over 
maritime areas in accordance with UNCLOS is prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty. 
B Scope of Article IV 
34 See n I above, p 264. 
35Kaye, Stuart Australia 's Maritime Boundaries (Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No 4, 
Wollongong, 1995), p 193 . 
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The argument that claimant states are prevented by the Antarctic Treaty from 
establishing jurisdiction in off-shore areas as permitted by UNCLOS is that to do so 
would be breach the second part of Article IV(2), which states that no new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica can be asserted 
while the Treaty is in force . 
Against this view, attempts have been made to assert that the prohibition in Article IV 
does not apply to maritime areas, but only to the Antarctic continent and iceshelves. If 
this argument were correct, claimant states would be entitled to both extend existing 
maritime zones and claim new ones. 
One such argument is based on an interpretation of Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty, 
which, by referring only to ice-shelves, should be taken to implicitly exclude maritime 
areas from the Treaty ' s application. 
However, ' this very simple formulation certainly does not accurately reflect the position 
today ' 36 as the A TS has extended its scope to encompass the marine areas surrounding 
Antarctica. 
Further, it would seem that the Parties intended that the Treaty would apply to the 
surrounding waters of the Antarctic continent. The application of the Treaty to High 
Seas south of 60 ° was one of the main issues of the 1959 diplomatic Conference in 
Washington which produced the Antarctic Treaty. Some states participating in the 
negotiations opposed the application of the Treaty to High Seas areas, particularly in 
relation to the demilitarisation provisions. It should be recalled that the Treaty was 
negotiated in a Cold War environment with both the United States and the Soviet Union 
in attendance. However, most of the participants felt that, in order to effectively 
36 
Kaye, Stuart and Rothwell , Donald R " Australia ' s Antarctic Maritime Claims and Boundaries" Ocean 
Development and International Law, Volume 26, 195, p 199. 
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demilitarise the continent, the seas surrounding the continent had to be included, 
particularly to cover ice shelves which could be used as a site for a military base.
37 
Accordingly a compromise was reached whereby in effect the high seas would be 
excluded from the zone of application 'from the point of view of demilitarisation and 
inspection, with the exception of ice shelves, which would be treated as if they were 
land'. 
38 The intention would therefore seem to have been that where the provisions of 
the treaty conflicted with the rights of states in high seas areas, the latter would prevail. 
However, it would still seem to have been the intention of the drafters that the 
Convention apply to the waters south of 60°. 
This is clear from a number of interpretations which were agreed upon at the time of 
adoption of the text by the Conference, including an understanding that the position of 
territorial waters would be governed by the provisions of Article IV. The interpretation 
of the New Zealand delegation of those understandings was that 'in other words, parties 
were free to assert or deny that there were areas of territorial waters around particular 
sectors of Antarctica.'
39 Therefore it is clear that Article IV was intended, quite clearly, 
to deal with maritime as well as continental claims. 
The alternative argument that Article VI should be interpreted as meaning that all the 
maritime areas south of 60 are high seas and are to remain so also seems contrary to the 
expressed intention of the Parties, as well as being an uncomfortable interpretation of 
the Article. A better interpretation of Article VI is that it preserves the rights of all 
parties on the high seas, wherever those high seas exist in the Treaty area. It offers no 
guidance as to which areas are high seas, consistent with the other articles of the Treaty, 
it leaves it open to the Parties to determine, when necessary, the particular status of 
marine areas depending upon thei:: positions as a claimant or non-claimant. 
37 Report of the New Zealand Delegation, MFAT File PM 208/5/4/5 Part I, p 33 . 
38 Iibid, p 34 . 
39 lb'd ~4 I , p .J . 
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A further possible argument to exclude maritime zones from the operation of Article IV 
is that 'territorial sovereignty in Antarctica' refers only to land and ice claims.
40 
However, it has also been said that41 
Territorial sovereignty extends principally over land territory, the 
territorial sea appurtenant to the land, and the seabed and subsoil of the 
territorial sea. 
The concept of territorial sovereignty would not, therefore, necessarily seem to be 
limited to terra firma and ice. This interpretation of the nature of territorial sovereignty 
would seem to be supported by Article 1 of the 1958 Convention and by the intentions 
of the Parties, discussed above, that Article IV would deal with both maritime and land 
claims discussed above. This question of what is a claim to 'territorial sovereignty' is 
more relevant to the nature of the maritime claim being asserted, rather than as to the 
application of Article IV 
It has also been argued that 'claim' refers to land and possibly ice, but not to adjacent 
maritime areas, because the inclusion of a specific provision in CCAMLR preserving 
the rights of claimants to exercise coastal state jurisdiction under international law 
implies that such rights are not dealt with in the Antarctic Treaty.42 Article IV(2)(b) of 
CCAMLR provides that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as 
a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of, or as prejudicing, any 
right or claim or basis of claim to exercise coastal state jurisdiction under 
international law within the area to which this Convention applies. 
40 
See for example Watts, see above n 3, p 20, who argues that Article IV applies to 'territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica ' which only refers to the Antarctic continent. He further argues that the 
negotiators of the Antarctic Treaty would have been mindful of the distinction drawn in the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf between sovereign rights in respect of the continental shelf and full 
blown 'sovereignty ' . He therefore argues that ' sovereignty ' was used in its strict sense, and that the 
intention was therefore to exclude from the prohibition merely ' sovereign rights ' for certain limited 
purposes. However, it is clear from Article I of the 1958 Convention that ' the sovereignty of a State 
extends beyond its land territory '. 
41 
lan Brownlie, Principles of Public International law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), p l 07 . 42 
See above n 35, p 198. 
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However, the CCAMLR Convention deals with a wider area than the Antarctic Treaty
43 
and encompasses some sub-Antarctic islands outside the scope of the Antarctic Treaty 
over which sovereignty is not in dispute. Accordingly, it would seem that the inclusion 
of this no-prejudice provision in the CCAMLR Convention was directed at the rights of 
coastal states to exercise jurisdiction in the water surrounding those islands.
44 The 
provision does not state this specifically, because, in keeping with the dichotomous 
approach of the A TS to sovereignty issues, by being ambiguous it meets the needs of 
both claimants and non-claimants. It is open to claimants to interpret the provision as 
protecting their rights as coastal states south of 60 ° Sth. 
It is these provisions that give rise to the 'bifocal' approach, an approach 
which allows claimants and non-claimants to interpret the same language 
differently. 
45 
Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition in Article IV is directly relevant to the question 
of maritime claims being established in accordance with UN CLOS. 
C The Effect of Article IV 
Contravention of this provision essentially contains three elements: 
1) a new claim is made or an existing claim enlarged; 
2) the claim is to ' territorial sovereignty'; 
3) the claim must be ' asserted' while the Treaty is in force. 
1 The Territorial Sea 
43 It applies to the whole area of the Antarctic Convergence which extends in places beyond 60 ° Sth 
(Article I). 
44 
A statement by the Chairman of the Canberra Conference was made to this effect and recorded in the 
final act of the Conference ( 19 I LM 83 7). 
45 
Frank, Ronald F "Convention on Antarctic Living Resources" 13 Ocean Development and 
International Law 291, p 307. 
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A ·new claim' can be interpreted as being a claim which had not been made at the time 
that the Antarctic Treaty was concluded. Prior to 1959, the right of coastal states to a 
territorial sea and continental shelf adjacent to their territory was recognised at 
international law. All claimant states had asserted jurisdiction over a three-mile 
territorial sea adjacent to the claimed Antarctic territory. Chile and Australia had also 
asserted rights to a continental shelf adjacent to that territory. 
The Hague Codification Conference of 1956 had stated that
46 
It is now accepted that the rights of the coastal State over the territorial sea 
do not differ in nature from the rights of sovereignty which the State 
exercises over other parts of its territory. 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958 was subsequently 
adopted in Geneva.47 Article 1 of the Convention provided that 
The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal 
waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea. 
State practice as to the breadth of the territorial sea at that time was not uniform, and the 
1958 Convention was silent on the subject, although it was widely held that the 
territorial sea could not extend beyond 12 nrns. 48 
The right of coastal states to establish territorial seas therefore clearly pre-dated the 
Antarctic Treaty and cannot be considered to be a ' new' claim. Further, even if 
claimants had not already asserted such a right, it was automatically conferred upon 
them by international law. 
46 
The Hague Codification Conference of 1920 YBlLC (1956), 265. 
47 
516 UNTS,205 . New Zealand signed but did not ratify this Convention (see 516 UNTS, 266). 48
Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia United Nations Convention on the law of the 
Sea 1982: A Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers , Dordrecht, 1993), p 79. 
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The right to a territorial sea can be said to be inherent in a state's sovereignty over 
adjacent territory. In this regard the dissenting opinion of Judge McNair in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisherie/9
 case is often cited. 
To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea, 
international law attaches a corresponding portion of maritime territory ... 
International law does not say to a State: "You are entitled to claim 
territorial waters if you want them". No maritime State can refuse them. 
. .. The possession of this territory is not optional, nor dependent upon the 
will of the State, but compulsory. 
Present international law permits coastal states to establish territorial seas of 
12nms. If it is accepted that the territorial sea is an inherent right of coastal states. 
then it follows that
50 
when international law recognises that the limits of the territorial sea have 
been enlarged from 3-12 miles, it remains the inherent right of a sovereign 
state to extend its territorial sea claim in conformity with international law 
as recognised at that time. 
It is therefore concluded that by claiming sovereignty in Antarctica, states necessarily 
also claim the rights to a territorial sea adjacent to that claimed territory. On this basis, 
any assertion of rights to the territorial sea would be consistent with both UN CLOS and 
the Antarctic Treaty. 
2 Continental Shelf 
The arguments made above in respect of the territorial sea also apply to the continental 
shelf. The concept of a continental shelf also pre-dated the Antarctic Treaty. 
Customary law relating to the continental shelf was codified in the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf 1958.
51 The underlying concept has not changed with the conclusion 
49
ICJRep(l951), 160. 
50 
See above n 36, p 206. 
51 NZTS 1965, No 2 . New Zealand ratified this Convention on 18 January 1965 . 
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of UNCLOS. Article 2(3) of that Convention, and Article 77(3) of UNCLOS specify 
that 
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on 
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. 
Therefore, the rights of claimant states over the continental shelf which extends 
outwards from its territorial claim are inherent in that claim. Like the territorial sea, 
assertion of rights over the continental shelf is not a 'new' claim, nor an enlargement of 
an existing claim, as the those rights existed at customary international law prior to the 
conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Crawford and Rothwell go even further and argue that even if the continental shelf 
doctrine had been a post-Antarctic Treaty innovation, claimants would not be prevented 
by the Treaty from asserting rights over the continental shelf because international law 
would have 'done the deed' without the claimant state having had to do anything. 52 
3 The Exclusive Economic Zone 
There would seem to be crucial differences between the nature of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the territorial sea, which, although resulting in the same 
conclusion as to the arguable consistency of establishing an EEZ with Article IV, reach 
that conclusion by a different route. 
Firstly, the concept of an EEZ did not pre-date the Antarctic Treaty. Accordingly, it 
must be either a new claim or an enlargement of an existing claim. However, it is not 
clear whether a claim to an EEZ can be equated to a claim to 'territorial sovereignty'. In 
the EEZ the coastal state has sovereign rights over exploring and exploiting, conserving 
50 
• See above n 36, p 81. 
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and managing the natural resources of the zone. 
53 In addition. and in contrast to the 
territorial sea and continental shelf, an EEZ must be asserted by a State wanting to 
exercise the rights accorded to it in respect of the zone by UN CLOS. 
The rights of a state in the EEZ are arguably more limited than what is meant by the 
concept of territorial sovereignty. Brownlie draws a distinction between rights which 
are ' owned' and ' territorial sovereignty'.
54 He concludes that the EEZ constitutes a 
special jurisdictional zone rather than an extension of sovereignty. 
55 A similar 
distinction is described by Rothwell
56 between sovereign rights over the whole area of 
the EEZ and sovereign rights over resources within the area, with only the former being 
able to be equated to 'territorial sovereignty'. These arguments conclude therefore that 
establishment of an EEZ, while being a new claim, is not a claim to territorial 
sovereignty. 
However, there is a further argument that the claim to an EEZ is not ·new'. Rather, the 
assertion of an EEZ is not an enlargement of an existing claim but rather a recognition 
of a latent but inherent right to territorial sovereignty.
57 In this regard Kaye argues that 
the claim to an EEZ is not a new claim, merely an entitlement attaching to a previously 
claimed area of land. It is ancillary to a land claim, not a new claim in itself.
58 
A related argument59 is that the Treaty should be interpreted m light of the 
developments of international law since the Treaty was concluded. This argument is 
based on the theory of inter-temporal law established by Judge Huber in the Island of 
53 Article 56, Section I (a). 
54 See above n 41 , p I I 0. 
55 Ibid, p 183. 
56 Seeaboven27, p 163 . 
57 See above n 45 , p 307. 
58 See above n 35, p 203. 
59 This argument is made by both van Der Essen and Vicuna, (see n 19 above, p 245 and p 98-99 
respectively) and Kaye, seen 36 above. 
Palmas 60 case , 
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that the available maritime zones should be those created by 
international law in the course of its evolution. Vicuna argues that
61 
The exclusive Economic Zone is also covered by inter-temporal law, being 
a right which derives from coastal statehood status and which manifests 
itself in such a way as to be determined by how the law of the sea evolves 
to affect the rights of coastal States. 
It seems clear that a treaty should be interpreted in light of the rules of international law 
in force at the time of its conclusion, except where concepts in a treaty may be ' not 
static but evolutionary' . It would seem that in preserving the rights of states on the high 
seas under international law in Article VI the parties would not have intended to freeze 
those rights as they were on entry into force of the Convention in 1961. Rather, they 
would have intended Article VI to also protect any subsequent rights on the high seas. 
Therefore, it would seem arguable that claims made by states prior to entry into force of 
the Convention would, in the future, include any rights which international law may 
have subsequently attached to those claims. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there are persuasive legal arguments available to 
claimant states that the establishment of UN CLOS maritime zones is not prohibited by 
Article IV. In respect of the 12nm territorial sea and continental shelf, the argument can 
be made that these are neither 'new', nor claims which are 'asserted ' . In respect of the 
EEZ, the argument can be made that a claim to such a zone is inherent in a claim to 
territorial sovereignty and therefore is not an ' assertion' of the claim or ' new', as claims 
to territory should be seen in the context of the evolution of international law with 
regard to the rights which attach to such a claim. The further argument can be made that 
such a claim is not a claim to ·territorial sovereignty' . 
V STATE PRACTICE AND MARITIME ZONES IN ANTARCTICA 
6° Cited by Vicuna, in Joyner and Chopra (Eds) see n 3 above, p I 00. 
6 1 Ibid. 
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New Zealand, Australia, Chile, the United Kingdom, France, Norway and Argentina 
claim maritime zones in Antarctica. All claimant states have at one time or another 
asserted the right to a territorial sea. However, only Australia has proclaimed an EEZ 
pursuant to UNCLOS. The nature of the maritime claims vary. In 1927 Argentina 
advised the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union to
62 
'be informed that Argentine territorial jurisdiction extends de jure and de facto 
over the continental surface, territorial sea and islands situated off the maritime 
coast, to South Georgia, South Orkneys and polar territory not delimited.
63 
( emphasis added) 
In 1939 Norway proclaimed 
That part of the mainland coast in the Antarctic extending from the limits of the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies in the west (the boundary of Coats Land) to the 
limits of the Australian Antarctic Dependency in the east (45°E. Long) with the 
land lying within this coast and the environing sea, shall be brought under 
Norwegian sovereignty. (emphasis added) 
In 1940 Chile declared that
64 
All lands, islands, islets, reefs of rocks, glaciers (pack ice) already known. or to 
be discovered, and their respective territorial waters, in the sector between 
longitudes 50 and 90 west, constitute the Chilean Antarctic or Chilean Antarctic 
Territory. ( emphasis added) 
By Presidential declaration of 23 June 1947 Chile also proclaimed sovereignty over its 
continental shelf and in 1952 proclaimed a maritime zone for all of its territory of 
6-
200nms.) 
62 Reproduced in WM Bush Antarctica and International law, A Collection of Inter-State and National 
Documents (Oceana Publications Inc . London, I 982)Vol 1, 584-5. 
63 Argentina and Chile have also asserted sovereignty over an area enclosed with the territory of both 
countries, their Antarctic territories and the South Orkneys , South Shetland and South Sandwhich Islands, 
known as ' The Argentine Sea ' or ' The Chilean Lake ' . This claim is based on a concept of geological, 
political and geographical unity. See above n I, p 93 . 
64 Decree No 1,747, reproduced in Bush seen 62 above, Vol ll , p 311. 
65 ibid, p 448-449. 
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France established a territorial sea of 12 miles in respect of the French Southern and 
Antarctic Territories by Order No 5 of 13 January 1972. 66 It had previously restricted 
the fishing rights of foreigners within a 12 mile band by Decree 71-711 of 25 August 
1971 extended to Antarctic territories on 1 September. It declaration of an EEZ applied 
only to the Southern territories and not Adelie land.67 
Fishing Zones and EEZs have been established in the waters surrounding the sub-
Antarctic Islands which are north of 60° south latitude and therefore not covered by the 
Antarctic Treaty. These islands are Heard and McDonald (Australia), Kerguelen and 
Crozet (France), Bouvetoya (Norway), Prince Edward and Marion (South Africa) . 
It can therefore be concluded that the practice of claimants in asserting maritime zones 
is only consistent in respect of territorial seas (although not always in respect of 
breadth). There would seem to be no consistent approach taken by claimants to 
asserting continental shelves or EEZs adjacent to their continental claims. 
This inconsistency would seem to be a function of both the ambiguity of Article IV and 
the political environment of the A TS. 
A Australian Maritime Claims In Antarctica 
In 1992 Joyner stated that68 
If offshore maritime zones were proclaimed by one claimant state 
independent of the Antarctic Treaty arrangement, the legal status of that 
proclamation would become largely a matter of political conjecture and 
debate, lacking substantial legal credibility with the international 
community. 
66 
Vicuna in Chopra and Joyner eds seen 3 above, p I 04 . 
67 Ibid, p I 08 . 
68 See above n I , p 92. 
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However, in 1994 Australia did exactly that by proclaiming an EEZ which operated for 
all its external territories, including the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). 
The AA T comprises 
... all islands and territory, other than Adelie Land, situated south of the 60th 
degree south latitude and lying between the 160th degree east longitude and the 
45th degree east longitude.
69 
The Territory was placed under the authority of the Commonwealth of Australia by an 
Order in Council of the British Government, the British Government having previously 
asserted sovereignty over the area. 
70 This part of the paper considers Australian policy 
in respect of asserting its sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones adjacent to the 
AAT. Australian practice in this regard makes a useful case study, and is particularly 
appropriate for comparison with New Zealand, for several reasons. 
Firstly, the circumstances under which both Australia and New Zealand came to assert 
sovereignty over Antarctic territory (by way of an inheritance from the United 
Kingdom), and therefore the legal basis of their claims. are very similar.
71 
Secondly, in establishing an EEZ on the basis of the rights conferred upon Australia as a 
coastal state under UNCLOS, Australia has gone where no claimant had gone before, 
and where to date, no other claimant has followed. 
Thirdly, Australia is New Zealand's most important bilateral partner and has tended to 
share common interests with New Zealand on Antarctic matters. Both countries are 
'Antarctic Gateway' countries by virtue of their proximity to the continent. Further. 
their territorial claims abut at 160 ° East Longitude, which will presumably necessitate, 
at some future point, a delimitation exercise in respect of their common boundary. Such 
69 Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933, Section 2. 
70 
"Australian Law in Antarctica" House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, November 1992. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p 2. 
71 
Both recognise the validity of the other 's claims, as well as those of the UK and Norway who 
reciprocate that recognition. 
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an exercise may be further complicated if New Zealand were to seek to delimit the 
continental shelf around the Balleny Islands which lie between 160 ° and 170 ° East 
Longitude. 
The EEZ established in 1992 was not the first maritime zone asserted by Australia with 
respect to the AA T. In fact, Australia had previously asserted rights to a territorial sea, 
continental shelf and fisheries zone. 
1 The Territorial Sea 
Australia, like New Zealand, had previously asserted the right to a territorial sea 
adjacent to its Antarctic territories. However, it was not until the enactment of the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973 that Australia formally proclaimed a three nautical mile 
territorial sea around continental and external territories. In 1990 it extended the 
Australian territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles by way of a proclamation issued under that 
Act. 72 
2 The Continental Shelf 
In 1953 Australia proclaimed a continental shelf around its coastline which implicitly 
included the AA T. 73 The Continental Shelf and Living Resources Act 1968 was 
subsequently applied to the AA T. An amendment in 1994 to the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act adopted the more expansive UNCLOS definition of the Continental Shelf. 
While Australia has purported to legislate for the continental shelf adjacent to the AA T, 
these laws have never been applied in practice,74 with the exception of the Antarctic 
Mining Prohibition Act 1991 which extends to the continental shelf of the AA T and is 
applied not only to Australian nationals but also nationals of other Contracting Parties. 
72 A YBIL Yol 13 p 277 . 
73 
See above n 36, p 81 . 
74 Ibid, p 207. 
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3 The Exclusive Economic Zone 
In 1979, Australia amended the Fisheries Act 1952 to create a 200nm Australian 
Fisheries Zone (AFZ) and which operated for all of Australia, including its external 
territories and therefore the AA T. However, in a proclamation one month later, the 
waters adjacent to the AAT were designated as 'excepted waters' from the AFZ. The 
effect of such an action was to make the applicable fisheries legislation enforceable only 
against Australian nationals and vessels, but not against foreign nationals and vessels. 
Australian nationals and vessels are still caught because even though those waters were 
not part of the AFZ, they were still 'proclaimed waters' for the purposes of the Act. 
This legislation was subsequently replaced by the Fisheries Management Act 1991 
which adopted a similar exemption to exclude the waters of the AA T from the AFZ. 
75 
By including the waters as part of the AFZ for even just one month, Australia signified 
their right to exercise jurisdiction over those waters as an incident of their claim to the 
AAT and as a coastal state under UNCLOS. In Australia's view, the assertion of 
sovereign rights over resources in the 200nm zone is wholly consistent with the 
A . T 76 ntarctic reaty: 
... the existence of such rights is merely an attribute of their (the claimant's) 
sovereignty over the adjacent land and that they enjoy such rights not through 
any extension of sovereignty but simply be direct operation of law. 
The Australian Government further argued that claims relating to off-shore jurisdictions 
are not claims to 'territorial sovereignty' as prohibited by Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
The reason given at the time for restricting that jurisdiction to Australian vessels and 
nationals was the need to tread carefully with respect to its Antarctic treaty partners and 
75 
See above n 36, p 209 . 
76 
Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Yol 51 , no 2, p I O (February 1980). 
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to enable negotiations for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources to be successfully concluded. 
More recently, on 1 August 1994, Australia proclaimed an EEZ around both the 
mainland and external territories, including the AA T. This was consistent with a policy 
designed to ensure Australia claimed the range of maritime zones allowed under the 
new LOS and to put in place a regime that would eventually allow ratification of 
UNCLOS. 77 By implication therefore, the Australian Government considered the 
establishment of such a regime to also be consistent with the Antarctic Treaty. 
However, there has been no consequential alteration of the scope of the AFZ, and 
therefore the actual legal regime applicable to the waters adjacent to the AA T remains 
as it was prior to proclamation of the EEZ. 
Two conclusions might be drawn from such an action. Firstly, it is possible to conclude 
that Australia's purpose in establishing the EEZ was not in fact to gain benefits from the 
exercise of the sovereign rights and jurisdiction conferred upon it in respect of the EEZ 
under the UN CLOS. In 1989 at the top of the list of policy objectives of the Australian 
Government in Antarctica, was to 
preserve our sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, including 
our sovereign rights over the adjacent offshore areas; 
The second, is that they were not confident as to how such an action would be received 
by other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty and the international community in general. 
Having concluded that there was scope to apply Australian legislation to the AA T, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had advised that 'Whether to do so in any 
particular case becomes a matter of policy judgment. ' 78 The policy reason cited at the 
time was ·to ensure that the operation of CCAMLR in the AAT would not be impeded 
77 
See above n 36, p 209. 
78 
See above n 70 p 14. 
29 
by Australian legislation'. 79 In other words, although legally entitled to establish an 
EEZ, a political decision was made to exercise forbearance in exercising jurisdiction 
over the EEZ. However, CCAMLR also applies to the EEZ around Heard and 
MacDonald Islands, which is part of the AFZ and would not therefore be presumed to 
raise the same problems. 
Rather the difference is that those islands are north of 60 degrees and therefore are 
outside the Antarctic Treaty area. Accordingly, the conclusion can be drawn that for 
political as well as legal reasons, it is the Antarctic Treaty which influenced Australian 
policy in this regard, rather than concerns about impeding CCAMLR. It is interesting 
that several years on, when CCAMLR's effectiveness is being threatened by the fishing 
activities of third parties, and in fact Australian assertion of jurisdiction over the AAT 
EEZ might provide a legal basis for Australia to enforce CCAMLR measures against 
illegal fishers thereby enhancing its operation, Australia has chosen to continue to not 
assert its EEZ rights against foreign nationals and vessels. Even prior to the 
establishment of the EEZ, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, in its 1992 inquiry into the legal regimes of Australia's 
External Territories and the Jervis Bay Territory, recommended that the AFZ include 
the waters adjacent to the AAT, and expressed the view that the non-enforcement of 
Australia ' s obligations under CCAMLR against foreign nationals and vessels was 
inconsistent with Australia ' s claims of sovereignty over the Territory.
80 
At the heart of this reluctance must be Australia ' s concerns as to the reactions of its 
fellow Antarctic Treaty partners and the rest of the world . Any action against third 
party nationals or vessels could potentially initiate a process of wider examination of the 
legitimacy of Australia ' s claim; it is to be expected that Australian policy is designed to 
avoid this eventuality. 
79 
See above n 36, p 16. 
80 See above n 70, p 18. 
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In addition to the legal and political difficulties of exercising jurisdiction in the EEZ 
against foreign nationals and vessels is that the sheer logistical difficulties of enforcing 
any such legislation made its application practically unfeasible and politically 
undesirable. As Kaye correctly points out81 
Attempting to enforce a maritime zone that few States recognise is to call 
attention to a claim in a part of the world that few States have evidenced an 
interest in ... In addition, it would be logistically difficult to adequately 
enforce legislation for an AA T EEZ against foreign nationals, and to 
utilise such unenforceable legislation might aid the impression that the 
Australian claim was a 'paper' one. 
Australia has not attempted to determine the outer limits of the EEZ and the baselines 
from which the Zone would extend are likewise yet to be specified. 
The conclusion may be drawn that Australia established the EEZ for the purpose of 
reinforcing their claim to the AAT, or at least, to be seen to be acting consistently with 
their assertion of a valid claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. A failure to 
establish the maritime zones which are the entitlement of a coastal state under UN CLOS 
could be interpreted as an admission of doubt as to Australia' s status as a coastal state in 
Antarctica and to the validity of their territorial claim. 
It should be recalled that, legally , the Antarctic Treaty provisions themselves explicitly 
deprive any such acts purported to be the exercise of sovereignty of any legal effect for 
the duration of the treaty. However, it is not clear what effect this Article would have in 
practice if in fact the Treaty were actually dissolved, or if a Party were to withdraw from 
it. Further, in the words of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
8 1 
.. . the stipulation that acts taking place while the Antarctic Treaty is in 
force do not constitute a basis for asserting or supporting a claim to 
territorial sovereignty does not mean that those acts are themselves 
prohibited by the Treaty. 
See above n 35 , p 193 . 
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Other claimant states have not followed Australia's example. In the case of Norway. the 
United Kingdom, Chile and Argentina the existence of overlapping or contested claims 
would seem to make such an action politically unfeasible, particularly in light of the 
hyper-sensitivity of claimants to the Antarctic peninsular. 
In fact, as Crawford and Rothwell point out, weaknesses in Australia's ability to 
exercise sovereign rights over Antarctic maritime areas are simultaneously a function of. 
and disguised by, the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. 
On the one hand the Treaty explicitly does not recognise Australian 
sovereignty, and, at least as between the parties, it nullifies the legal effect 
of acts done in the purported exercise of sovereignty, in the sense of 
depriving them of any evidentiary value in support of the sovereignty 
claim. On the other hand it leaves it open for Australia to continue to 
assert a jurisdiction it has never had the capacity to enforce, and provides a 
legal alibi for that non-enforcement which may ultimately help to preserve 
what is, so far, very much a paper claim. 82 
B The New Zealand Claim 
Auburn states that83 
For most of the nationals operating in Antarctica, a major motive is to preserve 
national claims. For New Zealand it is submitted that this motive is, in fact, 
dominant. 
This part of the paper considers the extent to which New Zealand has asserted a claim 
to, or jurisdiction over, maritime areas in Antarctica. The application of New Zealand 
domestic legislation to marine areas is considered, as are public statements of 
New Zealand policy regarding maritime claims to those areas . 
8' - See above n 36, p 55 . 
8' , See above n 2, p 5. 
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It is concluded that New Zealand asserts a right to a territorial sea, exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf in the Ross Dependency at international law. However, 
legislation establishing New Zealand's maritime zones does not include those asserted 
in respect of the Ross Dependency and until 1977 there is little evidence of any 
intention to do so. Very limited legislative action has been taken asserting jurisdiction 
over those areas at domestic law. 
1 New Zealand's Claim to the Ross Dependency 
Authority over the Ross Dependency was vested in the Governor General of 
New Zealand by a British Order in Council of 1923. The Order appointed the 
Governor-General of New Zealand as the Governor of the Ross Dependency who was 
' authorised and empowered to make all such Rules and Regulations as 
may lawfully be made by His Majesty's authority for the peace, order and 
good government of the said Dependency, subject, nevertheless, to any 
instructions which he may from time to time receive from His Majesty or 
through a Secretary of State ' 
Conferring authority over the Ross Dependency on New Zealand was seen by the 
British Government as a way of reinforcing the sovereignty of the British Empire over 
Antarctic territory. 84 The proximity of New Zealand to the Ross Dependency logically 
recommended it as being best placed to exercise administrative authority over the 
Dependency. The Order itself did not refer to the waters surrounding the Ross 
Dependency, only to 
.. the coasts of the Ross Sea, with the islands and territories adjacent 
thereto, between the 160th degree of East Longitude and the 150th degree 
of West Longitude, which are situated south of the 60th degree of South 
Latitude ... 
84
Malcolm Templeton, A Wise Adventure? New Zealand in Antarctica 1920-90 (Unpublished) Ch I, p 5. 
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However it seems clear from subsequent statements by the British authorities, and 
New Zealand actions, to have also implicitly conferred on New Zealand jurisdiction 
over the adjoining territorial sea, which was at that time generally recognised at 
customary international law to have a breadth of 3 nautical miles. 
2 The exercise of sovereignty in the territorial sea of the Ross Dependency 
Specifically, New Zealand promulgated the Ross Dependency Whaling Regulations 
1926 which purported to regulate whaling activities in the Ross Dependency. The 
original whaling licence had been issued by the British Government to Larsen and 
Konow, proprietors of the Rosshavet Company. They were authorised to
85 
occupy certain territorial waters belonging to His Majesty situated in and 
near the Ross Sea and The Antarctic Ocean for the purpose of Whale 
fishing and carrying of the Whale Industry generally within the territorial 
waters as aforesaid ... 
In 1926 the Ross Dependency Whaling Regulations were promulgated. Their effect was 
to modify the application of fisheries legislation86 relating to the licensing of whaling. 
The 1926 Regulations were replaced by the 1929 Ross Dependency Whaling 
Regulations, which are still in force. They provide that · it shall be unlawful for any 
person to engage in whaling in the Ross Dependency or in any portion thereof. ' In fact, 
both the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 198 I 87 and the Antarctic 
(Environmental Protection) Act 199488 preserve these regulations. 
In 1935 the Whaling Industry Act was passed which would appear to apply to the 
territorial waters of the Ross Dependency.89 The New Zealand registered Southern 
85 
See above n 84, Ch II , 16. 
86 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1912, which amended the Fisheries Act 1908. 
87 
Section 16(d). 
88 Section 53 . 
89 
It applies to ' any territory administered by His Majesty 's Government in New Zealand '. 
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Whaling and Sealing Company paid an annual licence fee under this legislation.
90 
This 
legislation was subsequently replaced by the Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978 
which only applied to New Zealand and 'New Zealand Fisheries Waters' which did not 
include the Ross Dependency91 • 
Writing in 1957, Ivor Richardson stated that
92 
While it is true that legislation is a vain pretension of sovereignty if there is no 
reasonable control of the territory in question, the statement is hardly applicable 
to the New Zealand regulation of whaling in the Ross Dependency from 1923 
onwards. 
He then cites the appointment from time to time of officers of the government of the 
Dependency, and visits of administrators to the Dependency on licensed whalers in 
ensure observance of the regulations, as examples of New Zealand asserting control 
over whaling in the territorial waters of the Ross Dependency 
The conclusion that New Zealand accepted jurisdiction over the territorial waters 
adjacent to the Ross Dependency is supported by an opinion of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of 15 March 1927 which stated that 
although the Order in Council of 1923 did not refer to seas, 'no doubt it must be 
construed as including the national and territorial waters appurtenant to this land' .93 The 
opinion went on to say that the Whaling Regulations could not authorise the arrest of 
vessels outside the territorial sea adjacent to the Ross Dependency. In the opinion of the 
author W E Beckett94 
We have. I think, agreed that the Ross Sea Barrier is to be considered as land 
rather than water and therefore presumably the TW (territorial waters) will be 
measured from the edge of the barrier ... 
90 
See above n 62 Yol Ill, p 54. 
9 1 
Seen IOI below. 
92 
"New Zealand Claims in the Antarctic" NZLJ Feb 19, 1957, 38 
93 
See above n 62, Vol lll , p 56. 
94 
Ibid. 
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The 1923 Order in Council therefore implicitly included the surrounding territorial 
waters under New Zealand's jurisdiction over the Dependency, and that New Zealand 
accepted they had sufficient legal basis to exercise that jurisdiction against both foreign 
and New Zealand whalers is evident from its promulgation of the Regulations. 
Subsequent official statements by the New Zealand Government confirmed that this was 
their view also. In 1974 Minister Norman Kirk stated that95 
The right to explore and exploit the natural resources of the Ross 
Dependency and its adjacent waters is a concomitant of New Zealand's 
claim to sovereignty over the territory. New Zealand has maintained its 
right to exercise control and jurisdiction within the territory since the 
passage, in 1923, of an Order in Council placing the Ross Dependency 
under New Zealand administration. 
There was one notable exception to public assertions of sovereignty over maritime areas 
and that was a statement by the Prime Minister (K. Holyoake) in relation to the 
application of the Continental Shelf Act of 1964 to the Ross Dependency. In denying 
that it applied there he stated that 'we have never asserted, and have never been granted, 
any rights with respect to control of the Ross Sea' .96 This statement was clearly in error 
as New Zealand had purported to exercise jurisdiction over whaling in the territorial sea. 
Therefore, at the time that the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961, the only pre-
existing maritime zone asserted by New Zealand was the 3nm territorial sea. As the 
right to a continental shelf can be considered to have automatically belonged to any 
coastal state at that time, it would be possible to argue that, although New Zealand had 
taken no step to assert such rights, they had been conferred upon New Zealand by 
international law. Further, New Zealand would now be entitled to a territorial sea of up 
to 12nms. 
95 
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Yol 24, no 8. P 42 (August 1974). This was in response to a 
Parliamentary Question on sovereignty in the Ross Dependency. 
96 
NZ, General Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (House of Reps) Vol 339, p 1.684 (28 August 1964). 
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3 Legislating/or maritime areas in the Ross Dependency 
97 The Ross Dependency has been, smce 1983, part of the Realm of New Zealand, 
although it is not within the 'limits of New Zealand'.98 The Ross Dependency would 
not seem to have at any time been embraced by the term 'New Zealand' , although 
New Zealand legislation has been applied to the Ross Dependency, and therefore by 
implication, to the territorial sea.99 The enactment of the Antarctica Act 1960 which 
implements the Antarctic Treaty, was the first occasion that Parliament had extended 
New Zealand law directly to activities taking place in the Ross Dependency. Ioo 
However, with the exception of whaling, neither the territorial sea or the continental 
shelf of the Ross Dependency have been the specific subject of New Zealand legislation 
or regulation. Legislation which applied specifically to the territorial sea and 
continental shelf of New Zealand would not seem to have applied to the territorial sea 
and continental shelf in the Ross Dependency. IOI Only belatedly were legislative steps 
taken to provide a mechanism to incorporate those zones into the New Zealand 
Continental Shelf and New Zealand Territorial Sea in domestic law. 
Legislative action m 1977 asserted the right to a territorial sea adjacent to the Ross 
Dependency, but this legislation has not sought to exercise the rights which attach to 
97 
Leners Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand, SR 1983/225 98 
This means the outer limits of the territorial sea of New Zealand. (Acts Interpretation Act 1924 Section 
4) . 
99 
The 1923 Ross Dependency Regulations applied ' the laws and usages in force in the Dominion of 
New Zealand at this date ' to the Ross Dependency, except in so far as they were inapplicable to the 
conditions of the Dependency. The Order also provided that all subsequent laws, as far as applicable, 
would also apply to the Ross Dependency, unless expressly disallowed or modified. They would extend 
to the Ross Dependency not as the law of New Zealand but as the law of the Dependency (van Bohemen 
para I). 
100
Gerard van Bohemen, The Laws of New Zealand: Antarctica (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992), para 2 10 1 
The Fisheries Act 1908, applied to the 'waters or New Zealand waters'. Later fisheries legislation 
applies to "New Zealand fisheries waters", which are defined to include the waters of the EEZ and 
Territorial Sea of New Zealand as set out by the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and EEZ Act 1977.--
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such a maritime zone. The territorial sea adjacent to the Ross Dependency remains 
excluded from the territorial sea of New Zealand at domestic law. 
New Zealand's maritime zones are established at domestic law in the Territorial Sea. 
Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 (The Act). The purpose of 
the Act is to 
make provision with respect to the territorial sea and the contiguous zone 
of New Zealand; and to establish and exclusive economic zone of 
New Zealand adjacent to the territorial sea, and in the exercise of the 
sovereign rights of New Zealand to make provisions for the exploration 
and exploitation, and conservation and management, of the resources of 
the zone; and for matters connected with those purposes. 
Part I of the Act dealing with the territorial sea came into force on 1 October 1977 and 
Part II establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) came into force on 1 April 
1978. The Act was amended in 1996 to include Part IA which creates the Contiguous 
Zone of New Zealand and implements Article 33 ofUNCLOS . 
The territorial sea is defined as 102 
those areas of the sea having, as their inner limits, the baseline described in 
sections 5 and 6 and 6A of this Act and, as their outer limits, a line 
measured seaward from that baseline, every point of which line is distant 
12 nautical miles from the nearest point of the baseline. 
The baseline is the low-water mark along the coast of New Zealand and all islands.103 
'New Zealand ' is defined in Section 2 as including the Ross Dependency, except for the 
purposes of Part II and section 29. The effect of this definition is to include within the 
Territorial Sea of New Zealand that adjacent to the Ross Dependency. However, 
102 Section 3. 
103 Section 5. Section 6 deals with how baselines should be drawn for bays, and Section 6A provides for 
straight baselines to be drawn where there are river-mouths, unstable coastlines , deeply indented coastal 
areas or a fringe of island in the immediate vicinity of the coast. 
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Section 1 ( 4 )(b) provides that the commencement order bringing the Act into force, may 
bring provisions of the Act into force on different dates in respect of specified parts of 
New Zealand. The Act has been brought into force in the mainland and islands, but not 
104 the Ross Dependency . 
Accordingly, Part I applies to the Ross Dependency, but is not applied there. This 
device effectively means that although New Zealand considers that it has a territorial sea 
adjacent to the Ross Dependency at international law, it has not incorporated it into its 
domestic legislation. 
By excluding the Ross Dependency from the definition of New Zealand in respect of 
Part II and Section 29, the EEZ of New Zealand and the power to make interim 
regulations for the conservation and management of fisheries do not extend to the Ross 
Dependency. However, Section 9(3) provides that any provisions of the Act including 
those determining the EEZ of New Zealand can be applied to the Ross Dependency by 
Order in Council. 
These legislative devices are less concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
Antarctic territorial sea and EEZ, as they are with sending a particular message to the 
rest of the world, and in particular New Zealand ' s partners in the Antarctic Treaty. That 
message is that New Zealand maintains its claim to territorial sovereignty over the Ross 
Dependency and all the rights and obligations at international which inhere in such 
sovereignty. 
It also operates to keep the possibility of exercising those rights open. They perhaps 
also seek, in some way, to make up for the inconsistency of claiming rights at 
international law, yet having no mechanism to exercise them domestically , which could 
be taken to imply uncertainty on New Zealand ' s part as to the validity of its entitlement 
to those rights. 
104 SR 1977/245 . 
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At the time of the second reading of the Bill which became the Territorial Sea and 
Exel usi ve Economic Zone Act 1977, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the 
Bill 1os 
... contains merely an enabling provision which reserves the right to take 
this step in the future, if desired. It is therefore fully consistent with the 
Antarctic Treaty, which provided that there should be no new claims and 
no extension of old claims. But if we had omitted any reference to the 
Dependency, that would have been interpreted as not maintaining that the 
potential for such a claim was there. If we had sought to add that territory 
to the zone, that would in fact have been an extension. The provision in 
the Bill is fully consistent with the Antarctic Treaty, but it also retains 
New Zealand's flexibility consistent with its sovereign claim to react to 
any future development in the area. 
It would seem from this statement that the New Zealand Government considered that to 
establish an EEZ in the Ross Dependency would be a clear breach of Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty. The 'future development' referred to would therefore presumably be 
either New Zealand withdrawal from the Treaty, its dissolution or the conclusion of 
some further inter-governmental agreement which recognised New Zealand ' s claim. It 
would not seem to suggest that changes in the political environment, or state practice, 
regarding maritime claims in Antarctica, would be ' developments ' sufficient motivation 
to take an action which the Government regarded as a breach of the treaty. However, 
h M. . l 106 t e mister went on to say t 1at 
The Government believes that it would not be desirable, in the light of 
these forthcoming discussions and the obvious practical problems 
involved, to establish an economic zone in the Ross Dependency at 
present. 
This seems at odds with the previously expressed view that to do so would in fact be in 
breach of the Antarctic Treaty, rather than simply undesirable because of practical 
105 
New Zealand General Assembly Parliamentary Debates Yol 413 pp 2,396-97. 
106 Ibid. 
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problems and the forthcoming discussions on the conservation of Antarctic manne 
living resources. It would seem to over simplify the Government's view to interpret this 
statement as meaning that it considered the establishment of an EEZ in Antarctica to be 
a breach of the Antarctic Treaty. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Minister's statement 
was in such terms. 
Rather. it seems likely that the Government was attempting to fudge the question of 
whether or not such an act was in fact an extension of its existing claim or a new claim 
and therefore a breach of the Antarctic Treaty. Therefore, in the event that any other 
claimant established an EEZ and the Government decided to follow this precedent, 
New Zealand could point to the provisions of the Act as, in the first instance, permitting 
the declaration of an EEZ, but in the second instance, as illustrating that it had always 
considered that it could do so. 
The 'practical problems' referred to are obviously the sheer logistical difficulty in 
determining the outward limits of an EEZ, and the exact scope of the territorial sea, as 
UNCLOS defines the EEZ by reference to its relationship to the territorial sea. 
The Ross Dependency poses particular difficulties in this regard, due to the location in 
the dependency of the largest ice shelf in the world, the Ross Shelf107. The role of ice-
shelves in determining baselines 108 from which maritime zones extend outwards from 
the Antarctic continent is unclear. 109 While the view was expressed in 1927 that 'the 
Ross Sea Barrier is to be considered as land rather than water' and therefore the 
baselines from which the territorial sea extended should be taken from the edge of the 
107 
See above n I, p 45. The Ross Shelf is purported to have an area of at least 325,000 square kilometres 
and is hundreds of metres thick . 
108 
The baseline would usually be the low-water line along the coast (UNCLOS, Article 5). 109 
For an analysis of the different views regarding the status of fast ice, pack ice and ice shelves see 
Joyner 'The EEZ and Antarctica: The Dilemmas of Non-Sovereign Jurisdiction' 19 Ocean Dev & Jnt'l L 
469, 471-476, Kaye, see above n 35, p 199-202. 
/ 
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shelf110, it has also been argued that the 'seaward margms of ice shelves are too 
unsteady and variable to serve as normal baselines under international law' .111 
A further consideration for the New Zealand government 1s the sheer resource 
implications of establishing such a zone and enforcing their rights within it. Even 
New Zealand southern most islands are approximately 1600 kms from the nearest point 
in the Ross Dependency. 
112 
A further difficulty, which would have been at the forefront of policy 
makers minds at the time and subsequently, is the existence of the 
American McMurdo Base in the Dependency. The US are the most 
vociferous non-claimants in Antarctica and their 'pedigree in Antarctica is 
as impressive as that of many other states with territorial claims to the 
area' .113 They do not consider that any of the claims to territory to have 
any validity, and consider the waters of Antarctica to be high seas right up 
to the coast of the continent. 
'The American Antarctic connection has been valuable to New Zealand from both a 
political and scientific standpoint.' 114 The degree of New Zealand's logistical 
dependence on the United States Antarctic Program to support its own is considerable, 
and it has been said that 'New Zealand could barely continue her Antarctic activities 
without the United States' .115 Sahurie states that 116 
As the possibility of exploiting resources in the Antarctic increases, 
undoubtedly New Zealand will strengthen her participation in Antarctic 
affairs. The more delicate consequences of such a course of events will 
affect her relations with the United States. 
11° Foreign Office Opinion on the Territorial Scope of the Ross Dependency Whaling Regulations, 15 
March 1927, reproduced in Bush, seen 62 Vol lJI, 56. 
111 
See above n I, p 82. 
1 \1 -see above n 21, p 3. 
11 3 
See Sahurie above n 3, 32. 
114
Prior, Stuart " Antarctica: View from a Gateway" Center for Strategic Studies Working Paper 5/97 
(Victoria University of Wellington, 1997), 17 . 
115 
A Hayter quoted in Sahurie, see n 3 above, p 18. 
116 
See Sahuries above n 3, p 19 . 
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Implementation of other Antarctic treaties 
The mechanism established by the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 1977 of asserting the right to these zones in the Ross Dependency, 
is incorporated by reference into both the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 
1981 (AMLR Act) and the Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 1994 (A(EP) 
Act).111 
The AMLR Act applies to New Zealand and New Zealand fisheries waters and therefore 
does not apply to the marine areas of the Ross Dependency on a territorial basis. 
'New Zealand fisheries waters' are defined by fisheries legislation 118 which refers to the 
territorial sea and EEZ of New Zealand under the TS and EEZ Act. 
The Madrid Protocol is implemented into New Zealand domestic law by the A(EP) Act 
which applies to any person in the Ross Dependency. The Ross Dependency is defined 
by the Act to include the continental shelf of the Ross Dependency. This is the sole 
reference to the existence of the continental shelf of the Dependency in New Zealand 
legislation. Section 11 (a) of the Act creates a prohibition applicable to nationals of 
other treaty parties who undertake mineral resource activity in the Ross Dependency. 
Not since the Ross Dependency Whaling Regulations 1929 had New Zealand directly 
applied legislation enforcing a 'coastal state' right against non-New Zealanders. 
C Comparison of New Zealand and Australian Practice 
Both New Zealand and Australia assert the right to maritime zones as a coastal state in 
Antarctica. While there would seem to be sufficient basis in international law to 
establish such zones, it is submitted that both New Zealand and Australia are inhibited 
117 
The operative provisions of this Act are yet to enter into force . They will do so on entry into force of 
the Madrid Protocol seen 17. 
118 
It refers to the Fisheries Act 1908, which has now been repealed and replaced by the Fisheries Acts 
1983 and 1996 respectively. 
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by the political environment relating to sovereignty m Antarctica from seeking to 
exercise their rights as coastal states. Hence their reluctance to assert their jurisdiction 
against foreign nationals and vessels. 
Australia has been more assertive m respect of their maritime claims in Antarctica. 
Unlike New Zealand they have incorporated those maritime zones into their domestic 
legislation and have declared an EEZ adjacent to the AAT. New Zealand by 
comparison has only belatedly created a legislative basis for amalgamating maritime 
zones in Antarctica with those of the rest of New Zealand. 
On the other hand Australia ' s involvement in Antarctica is not so intricately bound up 
with that of a non-claimant as New Zealand's so clearly is . Not only is there a high 
level of dependency of the New Zealand Antarctic program on the American progran1, 
but the United States has a substantial base in the Ross Dependency, and a long history 
of significant involvement in the area. 
Whether or not New Zealand will take further action to assert jurisdiction over maritime 
areas is uncertain. Any decision in this regard should be based on a clear conception of 
the objective of doing so. As mineral resource activities are banned in Antarctica, and 
the exploitation of marine resources is governed by CCAMLR, the only remaining 
reason for taking this further step would be to reinforce New Zealand's claim to the 
Ross Dependency. 
A failure to do establish maritime claims may be interpreted as a lack of conviction on 
the part of New Zealand as to the validity of its claim. On the other hand, the Antarctic 
Treaty can be cited as the reason for such forbearance without any inference as to the 
validity or otherwise of New Zealand's claim. The true genius of the Antarctic Treaty is 
that it can quite reasonably be interpreted as being consistent with both a decision to 
establish such zones or not to do so. It is submitted that, in making a decision as to 
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whether or not to more strongly assert New Zealand ' s maritime claims in the Ross 
Dependency, legal considerations will be subordinated to political objectives. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The determination of whether it is legally possible for claimant states in Antarctica to 
establish maritime zones adjacent to their claimed territory, requires consideration of 
both the Antarctic and the law of the sea regimes. UN CLOS creates a framework for 
maritime zones around the concept of the ' coastal state'. The identification of a ' coastal 
state' in Antarctica goes to the heart of the disputes over territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. 
The Antarctic Treaty and related Conventions are sufficiently ambiguous on the 
question of maritime claims to permit reasonable legal arguments to be made in support 
of the position of both claimants and non-claimants. This is hardly surprising given that 
this was in fact the clear intention of the drafters of the Treaty. While there are stronger 
legal arguments for the lawful establishment of territorial seas and continental shelf than 
there are for EEZs, there would seem to be sufficient legal arguments available to 
claimant states to justify the establishment of such zones in Antarctica. However, 
whether or not States decide to establish such zones, and the extent to which they assert 
jurisdiction over them, will depend on political , rather than legal , considerations. 
45 
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ANNEX B 
THE ANT ARCTIC TREATY 
WASHINGTON, 1 DECEMBER 1959 
TOGETHER WITH THE 
FINAL ACT 
OF THE 
CONFERENCE ON ANTARCTICA 
WASHINGTON, 1 DECEMBER 1959 
.. 
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 
WELLINGTON 
1960 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The Governn1ents of Argentina, Australia, Belgiun1, Chile, the 
French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the U?ion o~ South 
.\f rica the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Urnted Kmgdon1 
~f Gr~at Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of 
America, 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all n1ankind that Antarctica 
shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes 
and shall not become the scene or object of international discord ; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge 
resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica ; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the 
continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of 
freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during 
the International Geophysical Year accords. with the interests of 
science and the progress of all mankind; 
• Convinced also, that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for 
peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harn1ony 
in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations ; 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall 
be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as 
the establishment of military bases and fortifications , the carrying 
out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of 
weapons. 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel 
or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose. 
ARTICLE II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation 
toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical 
Year, shall continue, subject to the pro\·isions of the present Treaty. 
A~ T IC: L E ITT 
l. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the 
present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest 
extent feasible and practicable: 
(a ) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarc-
ica .::ha ll be c:xc h;i. n~cd tr> ncTm1t ma xim um cconorn \· and 
cffi cit'll ( y of opcr;it ion..; : 
b · ~cicntific pcr~unncl shall be C'Xl hanged in .-\nt~·Hl tic :1 ht·t \\Ten 
expeditions and stations; . 
: c: scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be 
, · exchanged and made freely available. 
2. In implementing this Article, every encou~agement. shall _be 
given to the establishment of coope~at1ve _ w?rk1ng relations . ,nth 
those Specialized Agencies of the United Nat10ns and other inter-
national organizations having a scientific or technical interest in 
Antarctica. 
ARTICLE IV 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as : 
( a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted 
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b ) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of 
any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
which it may have whether as a result of its activities or 
those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otheiwise; 
( c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards 
its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right 
of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. 
2. Ko acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is 
in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying 
a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights 
of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an 
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted 
while the present Treaty is in force. 
ARTICLE V 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of 
radioactive waste material shall be prohibited. 
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements 
concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions 
and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate 
in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules 
established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica. 
ARTICLE VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south· 
of 60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the 
prese~t Treaty ~hall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the 
exercise of the nghts, of any State under international law with regard 
to the high seas ,,·ithin that area. 
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ARTICLE \' 11 
1. In order to promote the objective~ and ensure the observance 
of the provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to 
in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate_ observers 
to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. 
Observe·rs shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate 
them. The nan1es of observers shall be con1mLmicated to every other 
Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like 
notice shall be given of the termination of their appointn1ent. 
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at 
any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and 
equipn1ent within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points 
of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall 
be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
4. Aerial observation n1ay be carried out at any time over any 
or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the 
right to designate observers. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present 
Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, 
and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of 
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its 
ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organ-
ized in or proceeding from its territory ; 
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
( c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced 
by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in 
paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the 
present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of 
the Contractin g- Partie'- relating to juric;;diction over all other pe~ons 
in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII 
and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1 (b) of 
Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying 
any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the 
Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts 
or omissions occurring while they arc in Antarctica for the purpose 
<i c~cn i, in '..: their f t111( tinn". 
ARTICLE X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertak_es to ex_ert appropriate 
efforts, consistent ,,vith the Charter of the United Nations, to the end 
that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the 
principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present 
Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves 
with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peace-
ful means of their O\,·n choice. 
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the 
consent in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach 
agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve 
parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek 
to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in para-
graph 1 of this Article. 
ARTICLE XII 
1. (a ) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any 
time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to pa~icipate in the meetings provided for 
under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter 
into force when the depositary Government has received notice from 
all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. 
(b ) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into 
force as to any other Contracting Party when notice of ratification 
by it has been received by the depositary Governn1ent. Any such 
Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received 
within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of 
the modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of 
ubparagraph 1 (a ) of this Article shall be deemed to have \vithdrawn 
from the present Treaty on the date of the expiration of such period. 
2. (a ) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry 
into force of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting Partirs who,e 
representatives are cntilled to participate in the meetings provided 
for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to 
the depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting 
Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation 
of the Treaty. 
( b \ Any modification or amendment to the present Treat\· which 
i, ;-ippr()\cd ;1 t c.. 11ll1 a C <l11f tT( ' i ll l' l)\· ;-i majnrit\· (,[ tlir C:t i n,lr: 11 ti1 1·• 
Pc1rti1 ·, tlH re rcpn·,t·11(ccl. irH l l[(lin !.:'." ;1 11:aj<>! .. il: (;r th r1,c \\ !JrH' l •' i):T~ 
2. \\'ithout prejudice to the prov1s10ns of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of sub-paragraph 1 ( e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerneu in any case of dispute ,vith regard to the exercise of jurisdiction i·n Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a Yie,-v to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamb-le to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and there-after at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest per-taining to Antarctica, and fom1ulating and considering, and recom-mending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding: 
(a ) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
( c ) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; 
( d ) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided 
for in Article VII of the Treaty; 
( e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; 
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in para-graph 1 of the present Article, during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition. 
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the represyntatives of the Contr3cting Parties participating in the meetings ref erred to in paragraph I of the present Article. 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall bn ornc cfkcti,·c when appro,-cd by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those measures. 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from the date of entrv into force of the Treatv whether or not any measures f acilitatin~ the exercise of such right~~ . .._ . h~n· b\"cl1 1m>p·1,n l. t r,n,i ckrnl 11!· :tppr1 1,nl :t, prr1,·ickd i11 1!1i -_\ !"ti t le. 
~cntatin:.s are entitled to participate m the n1eetings provided for 
under Article IX., shall be con1municated by the depositary Govern. 
ment to all the Contracting Parties immediately after the termination 
of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the 
pro\·isions of paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
( c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into 
force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) of 
this Article within a period of two years after the date of its com-
munication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party 
may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to the 
depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty; 
and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of 
the notice by the depositary Government. 
ARTICLE XIII 
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signa-
tory States. It shall be open for accession by any State which is a 
lvfember of the United Nations, or by any other State which may 
be in\·ited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the 
Contracting Parties \vhose representatives are entitled to participate 
in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the Treaty. 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected 
by each State in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall 
be deposited with the Government of the United States of .America, 
hereby designated as the depositary government. 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and 
acceding States of the date of each deposit of an instrument of 
ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the depo~it of instruments of ratification by all the signa-
tory States, the present Treaty shall enter into force for those States 
and for States which have deposited instruments of accession. There-
after the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon 
the deposit of its instrument of accession. 
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Govern-
ment pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and 
Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States 
of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the 
GrinTnmc nt, nf th e -- i~naton· ;:11d ,tr. < l'llin'..:: \t:tlt',. 
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In ..,vitncss whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly author-
ized, have signed the present Treaty. . 
Done at \Vashington this first day of December, one thousand 
nine hundred and fifty-nine. 
For Argentina: 
For Australia: 
For Belgium: 
For Chile: 
AnoLFO Sc1u~co 
F. BELLO 
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